The purpose of the study is to investigate the relationship between supplementary narrative commentary extent and focus on amounts reported in the primary financial statements, with corporate governance mechanisms; board size, independent non-executive directors, audit committee independence, audit committee members financial expertise. Ordinary least squares regression analysis was used to analyze the data collected from 96 industrial and service companies listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) for the years (2012)(2013). The results showed a positive relationship between the extent and focus of the supplementary narrative commentary and proportion of non-executive directors. Moreover, it showed significant negative relationship between supplementary narrative commentary extent with audit committee financial expertise and insignificant relationship between supplementary narrative commentary focus and audit committee financial expertise. Finally, no relationship was found between board size and audit committee independence with the extent and focus of supplementary narrative commentary. The main recommendations stated that the regulatory bodies and managers should pay more attention to supplementary narrative commentary. In addition to that, it is important to examine its extent and focus of supplementary narrative commentary with other corporate factors. Moreover, conduct the study on sectors other than the industrial and service sectors. Finally, examine other disclosure media-other than the annual reports, that the company might use to disclose supplementary narrative commentaries.
INTRODUCTION
The increase in the complexity of companies' operations and structures, gave rise to additional demands for information. Adequate disclosure of information is essential to the users of the financial statements to assess the timing and uncertainty of their investments (Al-Janadi, et al.2013 ).
Therefore, annual report is an important communication device between company's management and the investors. It is intended, to give shareholders and other interested people information about company's activities, position and financial performance. And because managers are the best source of information about the firm, due to their involvement in company's day-to-day activates, they held responsible of providing sufficient information about the company. In addition to the financial statements, narrative section in the annual report is important to understand the reasons for the changes in company's performance and position, and helps in informing shareholders on aspects influencing firm's performance that cannot be expressed in financial statements (AICPA 1994) . Narrative section in the annual report contains two classes of the narrative information:
 supplementary narrative commentary -976 -financial statements, and explain condition and events that shaped the information". Moreover, ASB defined the complementary narrative commentary as the information that" provides useful financial and non-financial information about the business and its performance that is not reported in the financial statements".
The reason behind disclosing information that is not compulsory is to reduce information asymmetry resulting from agency relationship between management and investors. If investors are not sufficiently informed they may reduce their interest in the company (Kyeyune, 2010) . Moreover, Kanto and Schadewitz (2003) showed that investors perceive companies with more disclosed information, about its operation and position to be less risky than companies with fewer disclosures.
However, investors and the management might have conflicted interests. Investors want to maximise their wealth, and managers want to achieve their goals.
Moreover, managers need to attract capital from shareholders and other capital providers. In order to do so, managers find themselves forced to provide more information in addition to the disclosures required by the laws and legislations.
In the literature, narrative disclosures found to serve two functions; either to add emphasize on a specific issue, or to exercise impression management. Impression management is a behavioural flexibility that helps managers on managing their image; in order to magnify their achievements, to mislead investors (Clatworthy and Jones 2003) .
And by managing users impressions managers are abusing their power by providing self-serving disclosures (Healy et al 1999) . Their superior knowledge about companies' operations, and the insufficient monitoring (Dalton et al. 1999) . However, some studies found positive association between board size and disclosures extent (Cheng and Courtenay 2006) . They attributed this finding to the fact that larger boards widen the expertise pool in the company, subsequently improving disclosure quality and volume. Finally, some studies found no association between the board size and disclosure volume (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Sartawi, et al. 2014) . It is worth to mention that in Jordan the corporate governance code for listed companies, recommends that firms' boards to be consisted of more than five and less than thirteen members. In this paper it is hypothesized that: 
.(2)
Based on the literature number of variables are found to have impact on disclosures (Tauringana and Mangena 2014; Sartawi, et al. 2014) . To avoid any influence on the measurement of supplementary narrative commentary extent and focus, five control variables were used in this study Company size (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) ; gearing (Schwartz and (Soo,1996) ; liquidity and profitability (Barako, 2007) and company age (Li et al., 2008) . Table ( In this study the disclosure index technique (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Wallace and Naser, 1995) 
SNC Cash flows from investment activities

SNC Cash flows from financing activities
Selection and Data Sources:
The target population of this study consisted of For the company to be included in the sample, it should meet the following conditions:
1-Company has been listed on ASE continuously through the period covered by this study "1st January 2012 to 31st December 2013" 2-The company was not taken over during the period covered by this study. Because companies under this condition disclose more information to explain the circumstances that led to the event.
3-The company maintained a positive equity during the period; because companies with negative equities tend to disclose more information to justify the poor performance.
4-Information about audit committees, stock prices were obtainable.
After considering all the previous conditions, the final sample of the study consisted of 69 Jordanian -984 -companies192 firm year observations.
Empirical findings:
Descriptive Results; Table ( 3) contains the descriptive information of variables. (Tauringana and Mangena 2006) . In addition to that, several previous studies found that investors and other users of the annual reports are mainly interested in revenues figures, and therefore managers have a stronger incentive to provide more explanations on income statement items rather than balance sheet items.
About corporate governance attributes, it is noticed that board size in the Jordanian firms ranged between 5 and 13
with an average of 8 members, this result is similar to (Sartawi, et al.2014) finding. Moreover, almost 91% of the boards' members are independent (no executive powers).
Regarding the audit committee, the mean level of audit committee independence is approximately 99%. This high percentage of non-executive audit committee members, in relation to the total number of members in the audit committee, is explained by the article in Corporate Governance Code for Shareholding Companies (2008) , that forces all the publicly held companies in Jordan to form audit committee; this committee should be consisted of a minimum of three and maximum of five independent nonexecutive directors. Moreover, about 31% of the audit committee members hold certificates in finance or accounting.
Regarding the control variables, respectively. Company size, the mean of market capitalization is JD 82 million. The mean for the gearing is 20.67% and that indicates that most companies in Jordan depend on short-term financing rather than long-term financing (Khamees and Al-Jarrah 2007) .
Meaning that companies are trying to avoid the expensive long-term financing costs. The means of profitability is 5%., Liquidity 2.55. And finally the average company age in
Jordan is approximately 17 years.
Statistical Results for Model (1):
Table (4) 
Hypotheses:
In this section, the result of testing the hypotheses will be present, and the bases for accepting or rejecting the hypotheses will be explained: (ρ=.001),the results imply that the inclusion of independent directors in firms' boards will enhance disclosure extent, and that firms with more independent members tend to disclose more voluntary information about the company. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and we accept the alternative one. This result is similar to the result reached by Al-Janadi, et al.(2013) , and dissimilar to (Sartawi, et al. 2014; Alhazaimeh et al. 2014) 
H1-
Statistical Results for Model (2):
Table (5) This result might be explained by the argument, that independent directors in developing countries including Jordan are independent in form and not in substance (Barako et al. 2006) , meaning that strong personal relationships between the independent and executive directors might be present. Those relationships probably will cause a reduction in monitoring power of the independent directors (Sartawi, et al. 2014) . 
Conclusions:
The key purpose of the study is to investigate the Examine other disclosure media-other than the annual reports, that the company might use to disclose supplementary narrative commentaries, these other media might include; firms' websites, press, social media, interim reports.
